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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: FROM CARROLL TO
ROSS, THE ODYSSEY OF THE
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The fourth amendment is in large part a reaction to the general warrants
and warrantless searches prevalent in pre-Revolutionary America.' The
basic purpose of the amendment is to prevent government officials from
arbitrarily invading the privacy and security of the individual.' The first
clause of the amendment clearly provides that all searches and seizures
must be reasonable.' The second clause states the warrant requirement
and the conditions upon which a warrant shall issue. There is nothing in
either clause to suggest that a warrantless search and a reasonable search
are mutually exclusive. The well known rule, however, is that warrantless
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable subject to a few well deline-
ated exceptions.4 The six recognized exceptions are consent,5 plain view,6
1. For a review of the origin and development of the fourth amendment, see generally
Grano, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 603,
617-21 (1982).
2. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 589 (1974) (quoting Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 498 (1958)). Accord United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528
(1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 769-70 (1966).
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
5. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (when a person voluntarily con-
sents, the police may search without a warrant and without probable cause); Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
6. The plain view doctrine applies to warrantless seizures as opposed to warrantless
searches. Items that a person knowingly exposes to the public are not protected by the
fourth amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1961). Thus, the plain view
exception is irrelevant to warrantless searches because there is no search at all. Plain view
does permit the warrantless seizure of such items under certain circumstances. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971). Whether the item in plain view may be seized
without a warrant depends upon whether the police had a prior lawful justification to be in a
position to observe the item that was in plain view. Id at 466. See also Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (objects plainly visible to police who have a lawful right to be in
a position to view them are subject to seizure).
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stop and frisk,7 emergency,8 search incident to arrest,9 and the
automobile.'0
Practical application of the exceptions is a complex and often conflicting
area of the law. The warrantless search of the automobile is illustrative.
Most warrantless searches of automobiles are conducted under the search
incident to arrest exception or the automobile exception. " Historically, the
automobile exception allowed warrantless searches under certain condi-
tions. These conditions are probable cause to believe the vehicle is carrying
incriminating evidence accompanied by exigent circumstances.' 2 A pre-
7. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (a policeman who identifies himself may conduct a
protective search of outer clothing incident to interrogation when it reasonably appears that
the suspect is armed and presently dangerous). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968).
8. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (police in hot pursuit of an of-
fender may enter premises without a warrant); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (plural-
ity opinion) (police may lawfully enter premises without notice when it appears from
defendant's earlier furtive conduct that he was expecting the police and that the evidence
could easily have been destroyed).
9. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (police may fully search a person
incident to a full custody arrest); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (police may
search an arrested person and the area within his immediate control for weapons and de-
structible evidence).
10. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (given probable cause, police may con-
duct an immediate search of a moving automobile); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132
(1925) (police may search a moving automobile without a warrant when there is probable
cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband).
11. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S.
42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Warrantless searches of an automo-
bile can also be justified on the basis of consent or seizure of a car subject to forfeiture
proceedings. See Chambers, 399 U.S. 42, 64 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting)
(consent search); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967) (warrantless search reasonable
when car seized and held pending forfeiture proceedings). The consent and forfeiture
searches are fully explored in 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT §§ 7.3(b) & 8.1(c) (1978).
12. Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What It Is And What It Is Not-A Rationale in
Search fa Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987 (1976). Exigent circumstances are emer-
gency situations where the potentially incriminating evidence would be lost, destroyed, or
removed from the jurisdiction if the police were required to leave the scene and secure a
warrant before searching the vehicle. In such a situation it is virtually impossible for the
police to comply with the warrant requirement without losing the evidence. The primary
rationale behind the exigent circumstances portion of the automobile exception is the inher-
ent mobility of the vehicle. 2 W. RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ARRESTS AND CONFES-
SIONS, § 11.1(b) at 11-3 (1979). See also Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 763 (1979);
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 12 (1977); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). Once the police have stopped a vehicle
on probable cause, the occupants are obviously aware that they are under suspicion and they
cannot be expected to wait passively for the police to return with a warrant. See Chambers
v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Thus, exigent circumstances serve as justification for the
failure to obtain a warrant when this requirement would force the police to lose valuable
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cise statement of the scope of the automobile exception has proved elusive.
Supreme Court rulings have been confusing and contradictory. Some of
the Court's holdings have sustained a warrantless search of an automobile
despite the absence of probable cause or exigent circumstances.' 3 Other
cases have held that a warrantless search violated the fourth and four-
teenth amendments' 4 when either probable cause or exigency was ab-
sent.' 5 Another line of cases recognized that probable cause and exigent
circumstances were both present, thus creating a legitimate automobile ex-
ception search of the automobile itself, yet held that the warrantless search
of a closed container found within the automobile was unreasonable.'
6
The frequency of plurality opinions testifies to the extreme difficulty the
Court has had in accommodating its conflicting views on the scope of the
automobile exception rule.'
7
Recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that major changes in the
automobile exception are underway. Initially, this effort focused on police
authority to conduct a warrantless search within a warrantless search, that
is, the warrantless search of closed containers found during the warrantless
search of the automobile.' 8 Unfortunately, these early attempts com-
pounded rather than simplified the problem. As a result, police officers
still could not be confident whether the situation at hand justified a war-
rantless search. Courts found themselves in a "labyrinth of judicial uncer-
tainty""9 that required a case-by-case review of ad hoc police judgments.
Recently, in United States v. Ross,2" the Court articulated a clear rule con-
cerning the warrantless search of closed containers found in an
automobile.
evidence. However, what circumstances constitute an exigency, making a warrant unneces-
sary, is an issue that continues to divide the Court. See infra note 192.
13. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967).
14. The fourth amendment was incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and made
applicable to the states in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
15. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (probable cause to search but
no exigent circumstances); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968) (no
probable cause for search existed).
16. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753
(1979).
17. See, e.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1974); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
18. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
19. People v. Brosnan, 32 N.Y. 2d 254, 344; 298 N.E.2d 78, 83 (1973) (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
20. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982). Ross reversed a Supreme Court ruling that was less than a
year old. See infra text accompanying notes 124-33, discussing Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420 (1981).
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Albert Ross was convicted of possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute, based on evidence police obtained during two warrantless searches
of Ross' automobile.2 The police conducted the first search immediately
after stopping the moving vehicle. The officers searched the trunk and
opened a brown paper bag containing a white powder that was later deter-
mined to be heroin. The automobile was taken to headquarters where a
second warrantless search yielded a zipped leather pouch containing
$3,200 in cash. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia reversed the trial court, holding that the car itself had been legiti-
mately searched without a warrant, but that the two subsequent
warrantless searches of the paper bag and pouch violated the fourth
amendment.22 The court reasoned that none of the specific exceptions to
the fourth amendment applied, and that the warrantless searches were,
therefore, unconstitutional. 23 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
when an automobile is legitimately stopped on probable cause to believe it
contains contraband, the police may search the entire vehicle, including
compartments and closed containers, as thoroughly as if a magistrate had
issued a warrant. 24 The Court reasoned that the scope of the automobile
exception is not limited by the fact that the potential evidence is located in
a closed container, but rather "is defined by the object of the search and
the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. ' 25
Ross clarifies the authority of the police to conduct a warrantless search
of closed containers found during a legitimate automobile exception
search. Despite its clarity on this point, Ross is not without problems. For
example, it completely avoids any reference to the requirement of exigency
for a valid warrantless search. This Comment will explore whether Ross
can logically permit, in the absence of exigent circumstances, a warrantless
21. The exclusionary rule requires that all evidence obtained in violation of the Consti-
tution must be excluded from a criminal prosecution. Evidence obtained pursuant to an
unreasonable search, with or without a warrant, is unconstitutional and therefore subject to
the exclusionary rule. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule extended to
state criminal prosecutions); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (the exclusionary
rule applies to fourth amendment violations in federal cases). This rule has traditionally
been used in cases where the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination has been
violated, since that amendment specifically prohibits the use of such evidence in a criminal
case. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Ross filed a pretrial motion to suppress
the evidence obtained from the warrantless searches of his automobile. The district court
denied the motion after a hearing.
22. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2159 (1982).
23. Id at 2161.
24. Id at 2171.
25. Id at 2172.
[Vol. 32:221
The Automobile Exception
search based upon probable cause alone, and will conclude that probable
cause alone is insufficient to justify a search of either the automobile itself
or any closed containers therein. In addition, this Comment will argue
that the proper rationale for the automobile exception is probable cause
coupled with exigent circumstances, and that, viewed in this light, the au-
tomobile exception is not the proper framework for determining whether
there is a right of privacy in closed containers. As the majority implicitly
concedes, the major premise of Ross fails to support its conclusion.
Notwithstanding its logical flaws, Ross has merit. The merit is discussed
as part of the Supreme Court's trend toward a standardization of search
and seizure law that provides lower courts with clear guidance and allows
the Court to withdraw from its case-by-case review of fourth amendment
issues.
I. THE ODYSSEY BEGINS: HISTORICAL ROUTE OF THE
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
A. The Carroll-Chambers Doctrine
The automobile exception was first articulated in Carroll v. United
States.26 In that case, federal prohibition agents were on a regular tour of
duty patrolling the highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids, looking
for violators of the Prohibition Act, when they spotted a car driven by
George Carroll and John Kiro, two suspected bootleggers.27 The agents
stopped the vehicle and conducted a warrantless search on the belief that
the car contained bootleg liquor hidden inside the seat. The police found
that the upholstery seat filling had been removed, and discovered a sub-
stantial amount of liquor. Carroll and Kiro were convicted of transporting
"intoxicating spirituous liquor."28 The defendants claimed that the war-
rantless search violated the fourth amendment, and that the evidence was
therefore improperly admitted.
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the agents did have authority
to conduct the warrantless search. The Court held that the search itself was
reasonable because the agents had probable cause to believe that the vehi-
cle was transporting contraband liquor.29 Writing for the majority, Chief
26. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
27. The prohibition agents had reason to suspect Carroll and Kiro. These same agents
had posed as employees of the Michigan Chair Company at a meeting with Carroll and
attempted to buy three cases of whiskey from him. A price of $130 per case was quoted. The
transaction, however, was never completed. The Court speculated that the deal fell through
because Carroll suspected the true identity of the prospective purchasers. ld. at 135.
28. Id. at 134.
29. Id at 155-56.
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Justice Taft stated that the reasonableness of a warrantless search de-
pended upon what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure at the
time the fourth amendment was adopted.3" The Chief Justice concluded
with the well-known phrase that the fourth amendment provision guaran-
teeing freedom from unreasonable searches "has been construed, practi-
cally since the beginning of Government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling, house or other structure,"
in which case a warrant must be obtained, and the search of a "ship, motor
boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practica-
ble to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction . . .
The defendants had argued that the search was unreasonable because
the prohibition agents did not have probable cause to arrest until after the
search had been completed and the liquor discovered.32 The Court re-
jected the argument that the right to search was dependent upon the right
to arrest. Rather, the Court concluded that the validity of the search and
seizure depended upon the agents' reasonable "cause to believe" that the
contents of the vehicle violated the law.33 Since the agents had such prob-
able cause, the Court held that the warrantless search was reasonable.
The Carroll Court did not address the question of whether the automo-
bile exception would apply in a "seize now search later" situation, in
which the police stop an automobile and, rather than conducting an imme-
diate search, seize the car, remove it to the police station, and conduct a
warrantless search there. The Supreme Court addressed the subject of a
search under these circumstances in Chambers v. Maroney.
34
In Chambers, the police stopped a vehicle and arrested the occupants,
who matched an eyewitness description of the armed suspects in a gas sta-
tion robbery. The vehicle was seized without a warrant and then driven to
the police station where the police conducted a warrantless search. Cham-
bers did not raise a fourth amendment issue at trial as to the validity of the
search, nor did he take a direct appeal from his conviction. Instead, he
sought a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied after an evidentiary
hearing.35 The Supreme Court granted certoriari to consider whether evi-
30. Id at 149.
31. Id at 153.
32. Id at 158.
33. Id at 158-59. The agents had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained liquor
because they were aware of the defendants' bootlegging activities. Detroit was known to be
an active center for liquor, and the agents had previously spotted the defendants on the rum-
running highway. Id at 160.
34. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
35. Id at 44-45.
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dence seized in a warrantless search of an automobile at a time and place
other than that of the arrest was properly admissible at trial.
36
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that when there is probable cause,
an automobile, because of its mobility, may be subjected to a warrantless
search in circumstances that would not justify a search of a house. 37 The
Court quickly passed over the notion that the search incident to arrest ex-
ception justified a warrantless search at headquarters because the search
was not contemporaneous with the arrest.3" Rather, alternative grounds
existed to justify the search. The Court construed this case as falling
within the Carroll rule and it distinguished other cases in which it had held
that a warrantless search after the automobile had been removed from the
road violated the fourth amendment.39 Chambers, like Carroll, presented
probable cause to search for contraband. The only difference between the
two was that the Carroll search took place on the highway and the Cham-
bers search did not. Thus, the question facing the Chambers Court was
whether the exigent circumstances element of the automobile exception
should be extended to include searches of vehicles already in the physical
custody of the police. The Court answered that question in the affirmative.
Justice White, writing for the majority, noted that given the exigencies of
stopping a car on the highway,4 ° the police have only two options if an
effective search is to be made: either a warrantless search must be con-
36. Id at 46.
37. Id at 51.
38. Id. at 47. "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made. at
another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Accord Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968). The search incident to arrest exception to the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment is based upon the fact that without a search, the suspect could either destroy evidence
close at hand or reach for a weapon and inflict harm on the arresting officer. Once the
accused is in custody at the station house, the reasons justifying the warrantless search no
longer exist, and a warrant is constitutionally necessary before any further search is at-
tempted. For a discussion of warrantless searches of automobiles incident to an arrest, see
infra notes 75-91 and accompanying text.
39. 399 U.S. at 47. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968)
(evidence obtained from warrantless search of automobile at a time and place other than
that of the arrest inadmissible in a criminal prosecution because police lacked probable
cause to search); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). Justice White noted that
the situation in Chambers was different. "Here ... the police had probable cause to believe
that the robbers, carrying guns and the fruits of the crime, had fled the scene in a light blue
station wagon which carried four men, one wearing a green sweater and another wearing a
trench coat." 399 U.S. at 47.
40. 399 U.S. at 51. Chambers does not explain how or why the exigencies continued
once the police had taken all of the suspects and the vehicle into custody. With the vehicle
safely in police possession there was no chance that the evidence would disappear or be
destroyed. A possible explanation is that a confederate of the suspects might gain access to
the vehicle and remove or destroy the evidence.
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ducted immediately after the car is stopped, or the car must be seized and
held but not searched, until the police have a warrant in hand." Deter-
mining which option was the "greater" intrusion on fourth amendment
values and which was the "lesser" proved to be a debatable proposition,
with the majority concluding that for constitutional purposes there was no
real difference between the two. "Given probable cause to search, either
course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment."42
Chambers unquestionably expanded the concept of exigent circum-
stances.43 The Chambers rule states that if the Carroll criteria of probable
cause and exigency are met on the highway, the police may legitimately
conduct a warrantless search. This authority does not evaporate merely
because the search occurs in a safer place. The Chambers rationale ap-
pears to be grounded on the generic mobility of automobiles as a class as
opposed to the mobility of a particular car." Given this rationale, it was
inevitable that the Court would eventually disagree on the scope of the
Carroll-Chambers doctrine. That disagreement surfaced one year later in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.45
41. Id
42. Id. at 52. Justice Harlan's dissent attacked the majority's premise that under the
fourth amendment there is no qualitative difference between a search and a seizure. He
argued that in the vast majority of criminal cases, the search itself is the greater fourth
amendment intrusion because it has the potential to put the suspect behind bars. Since the
suspect is already in custody, the seizure and immobilization of the car is only a minimal
inconvenience. Id at 63-64 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
43. Moylan, supra note 12, at 1004.
44. W. RINGEL, supra note 12, § 11.1(b) at 11-4. The generic mobility rationale does
not require true exigent circumstances. Rather, it views the car as an inherently exigent
item, and permits a warrantless search in circumstances where there is no danger that the
evidence will disappear. See infra note 63, discussing the lack of any real exigency in Card-
well v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). One of the puzzling aspects of Chambers is that it aban-
dons true exigent circumstances while simultaneously emphasizing exigency as the rationale
for the automobile exception. "Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the po-
lice as to probable cause serve as sufficient justification for a [warrantless] search." 399 U.S.
at 51. The reasoning in Chambers that the automobile exception is justified only by exigent
circumstances but not necessarily by true exigent circumstances has caused considerable dis-
agreement among the lower courts. See infra note 192. The Supreme Court has not directly
addressed the issue of what constitutes exigent circumstances, and its previous attempts to
define the limits of Chambers have only confused the issue. See infra text accompanying
notes 64-74. At least one commentator has argued that the Chambers decision is responsible
for the chaos surrounding the automobile exception and should be overruled. Grano, supra
note 1, at 645-46.
45. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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B. The Scope of Carroll- Chambers Becomes Unclear.:
Coolidge and Cardwell
Fourteen year old Pamela Mason left her home in the middle of a heavy
snowstorm. Two days later, after a thaw, her body was found several
miles from her home. The police obtained an arrest warrant and a warrant
to search Coolidge's automobile on probable cause to believe that the car
itself was evidence of the crime. Coolidge was arrested in his home. His
car, which was parked in the driveway, was towed to the police station and
searched on three separate occasions. Vacuum sweepings from the car in-
dicated that it was highly probable that the young girl had been in the
vehicle. Pretrial motions to suppress the evidence were denied, and a jury
subsequently found Coolidge guilty.46
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search warrant was inva-
lid because it had not been issued by a detached and neutral magistrate.47
The Court also held that the automobile exception could not be used to
justify the search.48 The state had argued that Carroll permitted a war-
rantless search of an automobile whenever there was probable cause, and
that under Chambers, whenever the police are permitted to make a Car-
roll-type search, they may also sieze the vehicle and take it to the police
station before conducting the search. A divided Court rejected the argu-
ment, stating that application of the Carroll doctrine to this case would
extend the automobile exception far beyond its original rationale.49 Jus-
tice Stewart, writing for the plurality, claimed that the underlying rationale
46. Id at 445-48.
47. Id. at 471-73. The fourth amendment's requirement that a warrant be signed by a
neutral and detached magistrate "particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized" is an important constitutional protection. The fourth amend-
ment is designed not only to provide a means of redress for unlawful police behavior, but
also to prevent such behavior in the first instance. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766
n.12 (1969). Ferreting out crime is frequently a competitive enterprise. The circumstances
which govern "[w]hen the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as
a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent." Johnson v. United States 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). Thus, "the Constitution requires
a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the privacy of the home."
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
In Coolidge the search warrant had been signed by the State Attorney General who later
served as chief prosecutor at the trial. The state conceded that law enforcement personnel
have no authority to judge the sufficiency of probable cause for a warrant, but argued that
the Attorney General had not been acting as Attorney General, but rather in his capacity as
justice of the peace. Under New Hampshire law a justice of the peace unquestionably had
authority to issue a search warrant. The Court rejected the argument and adopted a per se
rule disqualifying law enforcement personnel from issuing search warrants. 403 U.S. at 450.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. at 458.
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of the automobile exception is the constitutional difference between a
house and a vehicle, and that a warrantless search of the latter is permissi-
ble only when it is not practical to obtain a warrant.5" The plurality em-
phasized that the Carroll-Chambers exigencies arose because the car was
stopped on the highway and the opportunity to search was fleeting. 51 Be-
cause Coolidge's car was parked in his driveway, the opportunity to search
it was not "fleeting." 52 The Court stated that "[tlhe word 'automobile' is
not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and
disappears,"53 and concluded that this was not a case where exigent cir-
cumstances made it impossible to obtain a warrant.
Three years later, in Cardwell v. Lewis,54 the Supreme Court issued its
second plurality opinion regarding the scope of the automobile exception.
In Cardwell, the defendant was arrested for the murder of an accountant
who had been hired by a third party to inspect the defendant's business
records. During the course of their investigation, the police towed the de-
fendant's car from a public lot to a police impoundment lot where they
conducted a warrantless search of the exterior of the car. Paint samples
and tire impressions taken during the search were introduced as evidence
at the trial to link the defendant to the crime. The defendant was con-
victed of murder and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. The defend-
ant subsequently filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court. The
district court held that the warrantless search violated the fourth amend-
ment and that the evidence obtained from the search should not have been
admitted at trial.
55
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the warrantless search of the
car was reasonable because it was based upon probable cause and invaded
no right of privacy protected by the fourth amendment.56 The plurality
opinion had two premises. First, Cardwell could be distinguished from
other automobile searches because the case involved a search of only the
exterior of the vehicle.57 Second, automobile searches are inherently dif-
50. Id at 459-60.
51. Id at 460. The Court listed several factors that indicated a lack of exigency. First,
Coolidge had ample opportunity to destroy the evidence. Second, Coolidge gave no indica-
tion that he intended to flee even after he learned he was a suspect. Third, the police had
known for some time that the car had played a role in the crime. Fourth, the case was
distinguished because the car was parked on private property. Id
52. Id
53. Id at 461-62.
54. 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
55. Id at 588.
56. Id at 591-92.
57. Id at 588-89.
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ferent from other searches and seizures because there is a lesser privacy
expectation in an automobile; its main function is transportation, and it is
seldom used as a residence or a place to store personal effects.58 Based
upon these premises, the plurality concluded that no privacy interest had
been violated and, therefore, the search of the car was reasonable.
59
The plurality then turned its attention to the question of whether the
warrantless seizure of the car was constitutional. Again, it found no fourth
amendment violation. The defendant argued that there were no exigent
circumstances because probable cause had existed for some time prior to
impoundment of the vehicle. Therefore, he claimed that the search of his
vehicle was indistinguishable from the warrantless search the Court found
unconstitutional in Coolidge.60 The plurality rejected the argument on the
ground that Chambers and not Coolidge provided the pertinent case law.6
The Court stated that no case or principle suggested that failure to obtain a
warrant at the first available moment foreclosed the reasonable seizure of a
car under exigent circumstances.62 The Court also noted that, in automo-
bile searches, an exigency can arise at any time, "and the fact that the
police might have obtained a warrant earlier does not negate the possibil-
ity of a current situation's necessitating prompt police action."63
58. Id at 590. The Court cited Almeida-Sanchez v. Powell, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) for the
proposition that "[the search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by
the fourth amendment than the search of one's person or of a building." Id at 279. The
Cardwell plurality reasoned that this lesser expectation of privacy can be attributed to the
fact that the main function of an automobile is transportation, and that an automobile is
seldom used as a dwelling or as a repository for personal possessions. When an individual
operates an automobile, he or she exposes it to public view and the fourth amendment does
not protect what a person knowingly exposes to the public. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 351 (1967). The plurality in Cardwell was careful to point out that it had not stated that
the interior of the automobile did not enjoy fourth amendment protection. "[T]he exercise
of a desire to be mobile does not, of course, waive one's right to be free of unreasonable
government intrusion. But insofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor
vehicle, it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry." 417 U.S. at 591.
59. 417 U.S. at 592.
60. Id. at 593.
61. Id The Court distinguished Coolidge on its facts; Coolidge's car had been taken
from private property, while Cardwell's automobile was seized from a public lot.
62. Id at 595.
63. Id at 595-96. The plurality opinion does not mention the precise exigencies in this
case. Indeed, there was no true exigency. The suspect was already under arrest so that
access to the car was impossible. The exigencies of Chambers were not present since the
exigency in that case stemmed from the fact that the vehicle had been stopped on the high-
way. The Cardwell car was parked. The only reference to a possible exigency is that at the
time the suspect was arrested inside police headquarters, he knew that the car constituted
potentially incriminating evidence against him. Testimony at the federal hearing revealed
that the defendant asked his attorney to make sure that his wife got the car, and that the
attorney only released the keys to the police in order to avoid a physical confrontation. 354
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Carroll, Chambers, Coolidge, and Cardwell are the primary automobile
exception cases.6 4 Carroll and Chambers state the rule; Coolidge and Card-
well are corollaries that attempt to define its scope. Under Carroll, prob-
able cause combined with exigent circumstances give rise to an automobile
exception to the fourth amendment.65 Chambers holds that when police
legitimately conduct a warrantless search under Carroll, they may remove
the car to the police station before conducting the search.66 The confusion
surrounding the automobile exception arises from the Court's plurality ef-
forts to define the outer boundaries of the rule. The Coolidge corollary is
that the automobile exception applies only when probable cause is unfore-
seeable. If it is sufficiently foreseeable that probable cause exists, then the
failure to obtain a warrant will not be excused.67 Under Coolidge, the con-
stitutionality of an automobile search depends upon a judicial preference
F. Supp. at 33. The Cardwell plurality concluded therefore that "the incentive and potential
for the car's removal substantially increased." 417 U.S. at 595.
The opinion does not address the fact that in reality there was no opportunity to remove
the car for the simple reason that the police were in possession of the keys. The dissenting
opinion presents a very convincing analysis of the lack of exigency. See 417 U.S. at 597-99
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (per curiam) is another automobile exception
case. In a brief opinion the Court upheld the warrantless seizure of an automobile and the
subsequent warrantless search at police headquarters. The situation in White was no differ-
ent than that in Chambers, and the Court held that Chambers controlled. Id at 68. White is
notable for the fact that all reference to the exigent circumstances rationale was dropped,
thus indicating that the Court would not require true exigencies for a legitimate automobile
exception search. See infra note 192 discussing the Court's failure to address explicitly the
exigent circumstances issue, and the consequent disagreement produced among lower courts
as to what constitutes exigent circumstances.
There are many automobile search cases that appear to be automobile exception cases but
actually are not. Whether the Supreme Court sustained or invalidated the particular
searches depended upon factors other than the probable cause plus exigency elements of the
automobile exception rule. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (random stop
of vehicle to check for driver's license and registration); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976) (routine inventory search of vehicle impounded for parking violations);
Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (standard police practice); Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (protection of the car itself); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967) (car subject to forfeiture proceedings). The most recent case is Michigan v. Thomas,
73 L. Ed. 2d 750 (June 28, 1982) (per curiam) (absence of exigent circumstances does not
preclude the warrantless search of a vehicle after the police have discovered contraband and
are conducting a legitimate inventory search). The common characteristic which removes
these cases from the automobile exception is that in none of them were the police actually
seeking the incriminating evidence they found; the police were inspecting the car for reasons
other than probable cause. Search incident to arrest and consent searches are also outside
the automobile exception. For a discussion of these cases see supra note 11.
65. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
66. Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52.
67. See W. RINGEL, supra note 12, § 11.l(b) at 11-5 to 11-6.
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for obtaining a warrant prior to the search.68
If this corollary states the limits that the Court had in mind for the
proper scope of the automobile exception, Cardwell gives contradictory
signals. The Cardwell corollary is that foreseeable probable cause does not
negate an otherwise valid warrantless search.69 Under Cardwell the consti-
tutionality of a warrantless search depends on the reasonableness of the
search itself, not on the reasonableness of obtaining a warrant.7°
Thus, Coolidge and Cardwell contradict each other on the scope of the
automobile exception.7 When probable cause is foreseeable, Coolidge re-
quires a warrant.72 Under Cardwell, foreseeable probable cause does not
necessarily prohibit a warrantless search.7' There is no convincing way to
reconcile the two plurality opinions. A possible explanation is that no
principle had emerged delineating the scope of the automobile exception
to which a majority could suscribe. The Coolidge plurality emphasized
that once the Carroll criteria were met, the reasonableness of the search
depended upon a subsequent reasonable opportunity to procure a warrant.
The Cardwell plurality emphasized that once the Carroll criteria were met,
the reasonableness of the ensuing search alone determined its
constitutionality.74
II. THE CONFUSION CONTINUES: SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST
IMPROPERLY EQUATED WITH THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The automobile exception is only one of several exceptions to the fourth
amendment that permit a warrantless search of a vehicle.7 5 The search
incident to arrest exception is often confused with the automobile excep-
68. See Moylan, supra note 12, at 1006. The corollary arises from the Coolidge plural-
ity's unstated linkage of the two clauses of the fourth amendment. The first clause mandates
that all searches be reasonable, the second states the warrant requirement. The unstated
premise of Coolidge is that where it is reasonable for the police to secure a warrant and they
fail to do so, any search of the automobile is unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.
Clearly, this unstated premise serves to emphasize the reasonableness of obtaining a warrant
over the reasonableness of the search itself,
69. 417 U.S. at 595.
70. See id at 592-93.
71. W. RINGEL, supra note 12, § 11.1(b) at 11-5.
72. See Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460.
73. See Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 595.
74. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The tension between these two schools of
thought is discussed infra notes 213-227 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note i1. The search of an automobile incident to a valid arrest is a very
small part of the general search incident to arrest doctrine. For a thorough discussion of
search incident to arrest in settings other than automobile cases see W. LAFAVE, supra note
11, at § 6.4.
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tion, 6 thus leading to poor fourth amendment analysis. The confusion
arises because the two exceptions are sometimes improperly equated when
the area searched happens to be an automobile. The fact that the area
searched is an automobile, however, is irrelevant to the search incident to
arrest doctrine.
The immateriality of the existence of a vehicle is underscored by the fact
that Chimel v. California," the leading case governing search of an auto-
mobile incident to arrest, did not concern an automobile search. In Chimel,
the defendant was arrested in his home on charges of burglarizing a coin
shop. The defendant refused to consent to a search of the premises, but
was advised that the arresting officers would search nevertheless as a
search incident to the arrest. The police searched the entire house and on
several occasions directed the defendant's wife to open drawers and move
the contents from side to side. The defendant was convicted, partially on
the basis of the evidence taken from the warrantless search of his home.
The appellate court affirmed, holding that the evidence was properly ad-
missible under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement.78
Holding that a valid warrantless search incident to arrest was limited to
a search of the arrestee's person and to the area within his immediate con-
trol, the Supreme Court reversed.79 Justice Stewart, who wrote the major-
ity opinion, took pains to define what he meant by "immediate control"
and construed it "to mean the area from within which he might gain pos-
session of a weapon or destructible evidence."" ° Justice Stewart articulated
two reasons for limiting the scope of the search incident to arrest. First, it
is reasonable to search the person for any weapons that might be used to
resist arrest, effect an escape, or harm the arresting officer. Second, it is
also reasonable to search the person for any evidence that might be con-
cealed or destroyed. Similar reasons governed the potential area an arres-
tee might be able to reach to grab a weapon or evidence. 8 ' The Court
noted that there was no comparable justification for extending the war-
rantless search beyond the immediate control zone. Any search beyond
this area would have to be conducted pursuant to a warrant, or if there was
no warrant, the justification would have to be provided by one of the ex-
76. Moylan, supra note 12, at 1012.
77. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
78. Id at 754.
79. Id at 763.
80. Id
81. Id
[Vol. 32:221
The Automobile Exception
ceptions to the warrant requirement other than search incident to arrest.8 2
The search incident to arrest exception has two elements. The first, lim-
iting the scope of the search to the Chimel immediate control zone, has
already been discussed. The second element requires that a warrantless
search be contemporaneous with the arrest. A search conducted at a time
and place other than the arrest is unconstitutional, and any evidence ob-
tained therefrom is inadmissible in a subsequent trial.83
There can be little doubt that the Chimel doctrine applies to the search
of an automobile.84 Indeed, the Court noted that the Chimel rationale was
the underpinning of an earlier decision in an automobile search case.85
Chime? also stated that the search incident limitations were entirely consis-
tent with the automobile exception.86 Prior to Chime, it was generally
accepted that the entire vehicle could be searched incident to arrest, in-
cluding the trunk area.87 The automobile exception was therefore infre-
quently used, and then primarily in prohibition cases.88 The practical
effect of Chimel, with its immediate control zone, was to restrict the use of
the search incident doctrine in automobile cases. Consequently, the auto-
mobile exception was relied upon more frequently after Chimel. Indeed, it
was only one year after Chime that the Court gave a boost to the automo-
bile exception in Chambers by expanding the exigent circumstances por-
tion of that rule.89
Perhaps the post-Chimel surge in the use of the automobile exception is
at the root of the tendency to confuse the automobile exception with the
search incident to arrest exception. Nevertheless, each proceeds on wholly
82. Id
83. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
84. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); W. LAFAVE, supra note 11,
§ 7.1(a), at 499. See also Comment, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle
Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 626 (1970).
85. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)). In
Preston, the Court held that the search incident to arrest exception could not justify the
warrantless search of an automobile when the search was remote in time and place from the
arrest. The Court reasoned that the rationale of the search incident to arrest doctrine, i.e.,
the need to seize weapons that might be used to either assault an officer or effect an escape,
and the need to prevent destruction of evidence of the crime, is absent when the search takes
place after the suspect is in custody. "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a
search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to arrest." Preston,
376 U.S. at 367 (citing Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 31 (1925)).
86. Chime!, 395 U.S. at 764 n.9.
87. W. LAFAVE, supra note I1, § 7.2(b), at 511-12.
88. Id See also Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States,
305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
89. Moylan, supra note 12, at 1004.
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different theories and each requires a different set of inquiries. The auto-
mobile exception inquiry is twofold: first, there must be probable cause to
believe that the car contains evidence of a criminal nature, and second, the
situation must be such that it would be impractical to obtain a warrant.
Arrest of the occupants is immaterial to the automobile exception.
Search incident to arrest analysis poses a different set of questions.
First, is the arrest lawful, and second, is the search confined to the Chimel
zone? Probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime will be found is
immaterial, as is exigency. Even if both are lacking, a warrantless search
incident to arrest will be constitutional. Conversely, under the automobile
exception, if either is missing, the search is unconstitutional.9 ° The factual
situation dictates the applicable exception, which in turn affects the extent
of the search. Search incident to arrest constitutionally prohibits the
search of a trunk, as it is beyond the permissible Chime! zone.9' On the
other hand, a trunk search under the automobile exception is not so
limited.
III. "FURTHER VENTURES INTO THE 'QUAGMIRE'-:92 THE
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WITHIN THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
A. Chadwick and Sanders
The Supreme Court did not have an opportunity to address the issue of
whether a legitimate automobile search under Carroll- Chambers included
the authority to search any closed containers found within the vehicle until
the 1977 case of United States v. Chadwick.9 3 In Chadwick, federal agents
in San Diego notified their counterparts in Boston that two people sus-
pected of carrying marijuana in a footlocker had boarded a train bound
for that city. Chadwick met the travelers at the station and they moved the
footlocker to Chadwick's automobile. The federal agents arrested all three
while the trunk was still open, and before the car had been started. The
District Court granted the defendants' pretrial motion to suppress the evi-
dence taken from the warrantless search of the footlocker.
94
The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fourth amendment pro-
tects the contents of a locked footlocker, and in the absence of exigent
circumstances a magistrate must issue a warrant before any search can
90. Id at 1012-15.
91. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61 n.4 (1981).
92. LaFave, Warrantless Searches and the Supreme Court, Further Ventures Into the
"Quagmire", 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 9 (1972).
93. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
94. Id at 5.
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take place.95 The Court reasoned that the acts of placing and locking per-
sonal effects into a footlocker manifested an expectation of privacy equal
to that expressed in locking the doors of a home.96
The government argued that the protection of the fourth amendment
extended only to items traditionally identified with the home, and that the
rationale of the automobile exception should be extended by analogy to
luggage placed in an automobile.97 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice
Burger rejected the analogy noting that while luggage and automobiles are
both "effects" 98 under the fourth amendment, the significant differences
between automobiles and other kinds of property permitted a warrantless
search of the automobile.99 The most important distinction between an
automobile and other types of property is the diminished expectation of
privacy in the automobile." ° Individuals have a lesser expectation of pri-
vacy in an automobile because its main function is transportation and it is
seldom used as a residence or repository for personal possessions. State
registration and licensing requirements and codes regulating the use of
motor vehicles also contribute to the lesser expectation of privacy in the
automobile.'
Unlike automobiles, the privacy expectation in luggage is much higher;
the contents of luggage are not open to public view, luggage is .not subject
to inspection at regular intervals, and it is not subject to official scrutiny. 102
In addition, the Chief Justice noted that the mere mobility of luggage does
not nullify fourth amendment protection. The Chief Justice observed that
this is especially true where, as in Chadwick, the warrantless seizure was
valid and police custody had rendered the suitcase immobile.'03 In short,
the two policy reasons behind the automobile exception-the inherent mo-
bility and lesser privacy expectation-do not apply to luggage. The Court,
therefore, concluded that the warrantless search of the footlocker was un-
95. Id at 11.
96. Id
97. The Court dismissed the first argument in short order noting that the fourth amend-
ment protects "people not places." Id at 7 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967)). The Court also found that the fourth amendment particularly protects an individ-
ual's legitimate privacy expectations against all unreasonable government intrusion. Id
98. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12.
99. Id.
100. Id at 12 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). See Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1973) (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52
(1970)).
101. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
102. Id
103. Id
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reasonable, and thus unconstitutional. 104
The Chadwick Court addressed only the issue of whether luggage was
sufficiently analogous to automobiles to merit extending the Carroll-Cham-
bers line of reasoning. The Court did not discuss the question of whether
the scope of a legitimate automobile exception search also carried with it
the authority to conduct a warrantless search of closed containers found
during the search. Up to this point, all of the Court's rulings pertained
only to the warrantless search of some integral part of the car itself. '05 The
warrantless search within the warrantless search, however, was squarely
presented to the Court in Arkansas v. Sanders.
10 6
In Sanders, a reliable informant told the police that Sanders would be
arriving at the Little Rock airport with a green suitcase containing mari-
juana. Sanders met an accomplice who placed the suitcase in the trunk of a
waiting taxi. Police officers stopped the taxi several blocks from the air-
port and requested that the driver open the trunk. The police found ten
plastic bags of marijuana in the unlocked suitcase. The trial court denied
Sanders' motion to suppress the evidence, and he was convicted of posses-
sion of marijuana with intent to deliver.'07 The Supreme Court of Arkan-
sas reversed on the basis of the Chadwick and Coolidge holdings.' °8
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding that absent
exigent circumstances, the police must obtain a warrant before searching
any luggage taken from an automobile even when the automobile itself is
searched legitimately under the Carroll criteria.'0 9 The Court reasoned
that luggage is a repository for personal effects and therefore "inevitably
associated with the expectation of privacy."" 0 The Court refused to extend
the scope of the automobile exception to include luggage merely because
the owner happens to put it in an automobile.
The Court noted that it had sustained warrantless searches under Car-
roll and Chambers, but that only two years earlier Chadwick had held that
a footlocker taken from the trunk of an automobile could not be searched
lawfully without a warrant. Thus, the Court had to decide whether the
luggage in Sanders was more similar to the car in Carroll- Chambers or
104. Id at 1i.
105. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1978) (glove compartment);
Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (passenger compartment); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583 (1973) (exterior); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (trunk).
106. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
107. Id at 756.
108. 559 S.W.2d 704 (Ark. 1977).
109. 442 U.S. at 766.
110. Id at 762.
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more similar to the footlocker in Chadwick. I ' The State argued that Car-
roll controlled because, unlike Chadwick, the vehicle in Sanders was in
motion when the police stopped it and the suitcase was not locked. The
Court rejected the State's argument despite the valid Carroll search. The
Court, echoing Chadwick, noted that the automobile exception permits a
warrantless search of an automobile for two reasons: the lesser expectation
of privacy in the automobile itself, ' 2 and the inherent mobility of
automobiles which often makes compliance with the warrant process im-
practicable.' 3 The Court stated that neither of these reasons applies to
luggage. The Court reasoned that the first justification of the automobile
exception was inapplicable because there is a higher privacy expectation in
luggage than in a car. The purpose of a suitcase is to transport personal
property, and one is not less likely to put personal property in a suitcase
simply because it is to be carried in an automobile.' '4 Similarly, the Court
acknowledged that a suitcase is just as mobile as the car in which it rides,
but noted that Chadwick requires the exigency of mobility to be assessed
immediately before the search, i.e., "after the police have seized the object
to be searched and have it clearly within their control."' "5 Once the police
have control of the suitcase it cannot be said to pose an exigency simply
because it was taken from an automobile. The Court stated that "as a
general rule there is no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage
taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from other places.'16
Thus, the Court chose Chadwick rather than Carroll- Chambers as the de-
parture point for analyzing the warrantless search within the warrantless
search. In short, the Court held that luggage, when placed in an automo-
bile, is an exception to the automobile exception; the fourth amendment
protects it as fully as luggage found elsewhere.' 17
Justice Blackmun dissented, noting that the Court's journey down the
Chadwick road would only create more confusion for all involved in the
criminal process: police, prosecutors, suspects, and the courts themselves.
He claimed that the majority's principles were opaque'' 8 and stated that
I11. Id at 757.
112. Id. (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1978)); United States v.
Chadwick, 433 U.S. I, 2 (1977); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974); Cady v. Dom-
browski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
113. 442 U.S. at 757 (citing Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1970); Carroll v.
United States 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925)).
114. Id at 764.
115. Id at 763 (citing Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13).
116. Id at 763-64.
117. Id
118. Id. at 771 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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"[sitill hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be litigated, are the brief-
case, the wallet, the package, the paper bag, and every other kind of
container."' 9 Justice Blackmun's prediction proved to be accurate; the
courts did have problems applying Chadwick-Sanders and found them-
selves making worthy-unworthy container distinctions, with some courts
extending fourth amendment protection only to the former. 120 Simultane-
ously, the courts were experiencing difficulty in determining the scope of
the search incident to arrest exception when the search happened to in-
volve an automobile. 12 ' To resolve the uncertainties surrounding the con-
stitutional boundaries of both the automobile exception and the search
incident to arrest exception, the Court heard the companion cases of Rob-
bins v. California122 and New York v. Belton. 123
B. Robbins and Belton
In Robbins, the California Highway Police smelled marijuana smoke
when they stopped a meandering station wagon. A search of the passenger
compartment produced marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The police put
Robbins in the squad car and returned to the station wagon where they
opened the tailgate and uncovered a recessed luggage compartment con-
taining a totebag and two packages wrapped in green opaque plastic. Each
package contained fifteen pounds of marijuana. Robbins' pretrial motion
to suppress the evidence was denied and he was convicted by the jury of
various drug offenses. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to
address the continuing confusion surrounding the warrantless search
within the warrantless search.' 24 The Court reversed, holding that the
opening of the green plastic packages without a warrant was unconstitu-
tional. Justice Stewart, writing for the plurality, rejected the worthy-un-
worthy container distinction as having no basis in either the language or
119. Id at 768.
120. The worthy-unworthy container distinction was a tremendous source of judicial dis-
agreement. The cases confirm the fact that Sanders confused rather than clarified the
container issue. For a discussion of at least 70 cases on containers ranging from wallets to
cigar boxes, as well as plastic, paper, and burlap bags, see United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d
1159, 1174-76 nn.3 & 4 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Tamm, J., dissenting in part) (en banc).
121. Compare cases holding constitutional a warrantless search of an automobile as inci-
dent to lawful arrest, i.e., United States v. Sanders, 631 F.2d 1309 (8th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Dixon, 558 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Frick, 490 F.2d 666 (5th Cir.
1973) with cases holding similar searches unconstitutional, i.e., United States v. Benson, 631
F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rigales, 630 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1980).
122. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
123. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
124. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 423.
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purpose of the fourth amendment. 125
The government's amicus brief argued that the Chadwick-Sanders
higher expectation of privacy rule should be limited to luggage-type con-
tainers because they are normally used to transport "personal effects."'
' 26
The plurality rejected the notion that the right to privacy turned on the
type or durability of container used, noting that the fourth amendment
"protects people and their effects . . whether . . . 'personal' or 'imper-
sonal.'" Justice Stewart reasoned that placing objects in an opaque
container and closing it are acts that manifest an expectation that the con-
tents will remain private, thereby making them immune from warrantless
searches, and stated that "[oince placed within such a container, a diary
and a dishpan are equally protected by the Fourth Amendment."' 28 In
addition, the Court noted that even if a worthy-unworthy container dis-
tinction could be read into the amendment, it would be impossible to ad-
minister because "[wihat one person may put into a suitcase another may
put into a paper bag."' 29
The plurality explained that portion of Sanders which stated that the
fourth amendment does not fully protect all containers and packages
found during a lawful Carroll search.' 3 ° The Court made it clear, how-
ever, that only two types of containers are excused from the Chadwick-
Sanders rule: an open container, and a container so distinctive that it al-
lows the police reasonably to infer its contents. 13 1 Justice Stewart noted
that the green plastic wrapping in the instant case did not fit either cate-
gory, 132 and thus held that opening the packages without a warrant was
unconstitutional. 
33
The Court used Robbins as its vehicle for holding that the right to pri-
vacy would not be confined to luggage and would not turn on the durabil-
ity of the container. The rule of Robbins was simple and straightforward:
the warrantless search within the warrantless search is unconstitutional.
Noticeably absent from the opinion is any discussion of the search of the
125. Id at 426.
126. Id at 425 (i.e., "property worn on or carried about the person or having some inti-
mate relation to the person").
127. Id at 426.
128. Id.
129. Id (citing United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en bane)).
130. Id. at 427 (citing Robbins, 442 U.S. at 764 n.13).
131. Id.. The Court noted that the plain view exception to the warrant clause justified
the warrantless search of these items.
132. 453 U.S. at 428.
133. See id at 426.
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passenger compartment of Robbins' car.134 The search of the passenger
compartment involved no containers, but the fact that it was searched
while Robbins was outside the vehicle raised a real question as to whether
the search of this area exceeded the Chimel immediate control zone. The
lack of discussion on this point is not an oversight; rather, it is the Court's
careful attempt to keep search incident to arrest and the automobile excep-
tion separate. The Court reserved its discussion of the proper scope of the
search incident to arrest exception, as it pertains to automobiles, to the
companion case of New York v. Belfon. 35
In Belfon, a state trooper stopped a speeding car and noticed an envel-
ope on the floor marked "Supergold."' 36 The trooper ordered all four men
from the car and physically separated them from each other and from the
car. He then opened the envelope and found it contained marijuana. He
arrested the men and went back to the car to search the passenger com-
partment. A black leather jacket belonging to Belton, one of the arrestees,
was on the back seat. The trooper unzipped one of the pockets and discov-
ered heroin. The trial court denied Belton's motion to suppress the evi-
dence taken from his jacket.'37 Belton then pleaded guilty to a lesser
offense but preserved his fourth amendment claim.'38 The New York
Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the search incident to arrest had
exceeded the Chimel zone because there was no danger that any of the
arrestees could have reached the jacket.'3 9 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that when an automobile is searched incident to arrest, the entire
passenger compartment, including any containers present, is within the
Chimel zone of immediate control.'
40
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted that although the princi-
ples behind Chimel (the safety of the arresting officer and the preservation
of destructible evidence) could be stated clearly, the lower courts had
found the principles difficult to apply in specific instances.' 4' The Court
134. Robbins is a good illustration of how the automobile exception and the search inci-
dent to arrest exception can overlap and cause confusion. The police inspected both the
trunk and the passenger compartment of Robbins' vehicle. The green plastic packages were
in the trunk and obviously beyond the Chimel zone. Thus, search incident to arrest did not
apply. The automobile exception would have justified the search of the trunk only if the
Court had accepted the worthy-unworthy container concept.
135. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
136. The trooper associated the word "Supergold" with marijuana. Id at 456.
137. Id
138. See Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975).
139. 453 U.S. at 456.
140. Id at 460.
141. Id at 458. Justice Stewart noted that no straightforward rule had emerged from the
litigated cases. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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stated that a reading of the prior cases suggested the generalization that
"articles inside the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compart-
ment of an automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within
[the Chimel zone]."' 14 2 The authority to search containers followed auto-
matically once the Court had defined the Chimel automobile zone. Justice
Stewart acknowledged a privacy interest in containers, but noted that the
lawful custodial arrest justified infringement of that interest. 143 The Court
concluded that because Belton's jacket was inside the passenger compart-
ment the search was within the Chimel zone, and was therefore
constitutional. 144
Belton and Robbins articulate clear, easily applicable rules. Belton held
that the search of an automobile under the search incident to arrest excep-
tion includes the entire passenger compartment. 145 Robbins held that a
search under the automobile exception does not include the authority to
search closed containers. 46 Belton expanded the search incident to arrest
exception, at least as it pertains to automobiles; Robbins constricted the
automobile exception. The rule of Robbins is just as easy to apply as Bel-
ton, yet its strength is somewhat diminished because it is yet another plu-
rality opinion in the troubled automobile exception area. With no clear
majority support, it was questionable how long the rule of Robbins would
survive. The Supreme Court answered that question only a year later in
United States v. Ross.
147
IV. RETHINKING THE CLARIFICATION: United States v. Ross
In Ross, a reliable informant told the District of Columbia Police that a
man named "Bandit" was selling narcotics from the trunk of a "purplish-
maroon" automobile. The informant stated that he had just witnessed
"Bandit" complete a sale, and that "Bandit" had told him he had more
drugs in the car. A detective and two other policemen immediately drove
to the scene and found the car.' 48 The police drove through the neighbor-
hood twice, but did not see anyone matching Ross' description. The police
142. 453 U.S. at 460.
143. Id. at 461. The Court distinguished the container cases on the ground that they did
not involve the search incident to arrest exception.
144. Id at 462. The Court made clear that the rule applied to all containers whether
open or closed, as well as luggage, boxes, and bags. The Court, however, refused to extend
the Belton rule to the trunk of the car. Id at 460-61 n.4.
145. Id at 460.
146. 423 U.S. at 428.
147. 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
148. A license check revealed that Albert Ross, Jr., owned the car; a computer check
confirmed that Ross' alias was "Bandit."
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left the neighborhood to avoid arousing suspicion, but returned five min-
utes later, in time to see a vehicle matching the description of the car they
were looking for turn the corner. The police stopped the car, searched it,
and found a bullet on the front seat and a revolver in the glove compart-
ment. They took Ross' keys and opened the trunk, where they found a
closed but unsealed brown paper sack about the size of a lunch bag. The
police opened the paper sack and found glassine bags containing a white
powder. The car was searched again at headquarters where the police
opened a red leather zippered pouch and found $3,200 in cash. At no
point did the police obtain a search warrant. Ross' pretrial motion to sup-
press the evidence was denied after an evidentiary hearing. The heroin
and currency were both accepted into evidence at trial, and Ross was con-
victed of possession of heroin with intent to distribute.'49
On appeal, the Supreme Court held that a legitimate Carroll-Chambers
search included the authority to search any movable containers found in
the automobile. The Court reasoned that the scope of the automobile ex-
ception is defined by the object of the search itself, and the places in which
there is probable cause to believe evidence will be found. 50 The majority
opinion retraced the reasoning of Carroll, noting that Carroll emphasized
probable cause as an essential element of the automobile exception.'" The
Court concluded that the rationale of the automobile exception applies
equally to any closed container found during a legitimate Carroll
search.' 52 The Court used a three-pronged analysis in Ross to support its
conclusion: the scope of the warrant clause, precedent, and analogy.
The warrant clause limits the scope of a constitutional search by requir-
ing that every search warrant "particularly describ[e] the place to be
searched and the. . . things to be seized." ' The Court noted that in both
Carroll and Chambers the police had probable cause to believe that the
respective automobiles contained illicit objects, but in neither case was the
evidence in plain view. ' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated
149. 102 S. Ct. at 2158-59.
150. Id. at 2169-72.
151. Id at 2163-64. The Court argued that Carroll itself emphasized the probable cause
requirement, pointing to the maxim that "where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used .... Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156.
152. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
153. See supra note 3.
154. In both Carroll and Chambers the contraband was secreted in an integral part of the
car itself rather than in a container. The bootleg liquor in Carroll was found only after the
police had ripped open the seat cushions, while the fruits of the Chambers crime were found
in a concealed compartment under the dashboard. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 136; Chambers,
399 U.S. at 44.
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that the Carroll search was reasonable since it was based upon probable
cause and did not exceed the area a magistrate could have authorized to be
searched, had a warrant been issued particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized.' 55 Justice Stevens applied the same
reasoning to Chambers and hypothesized a situation under both Carroll
and Chambers where the object of the search was in a closed container,
thus presenting a warrantless search within a warrantless search question.
The Court reasoned that it would be illogical to assume that the result in
either case would have been different, stating that since it was reasonable
to tear open the upholstery in Carroll, it would have been equally reason-
able to open a hypothetical burlap bag found inside.'56 The Court con-
cluded that "a contrary rule could produce absurd results inconsistent with
...Carroll itself,"' 57 and observed that any other reading of the automo-
bile exception would nullify the practical consequences of Carroll, because
contraband by its very nature is usually shielded from public view.' 8 The
Court underscored its point by emphasizing the statement in Carroll that
contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or
other vehicle may be searched without a warrant.159
The Ross Court analogized a closed container search in an automobile
to a search of fixed premises. A lawful fixed premises search is generally
not limited by the fact that separate acts of entry or opening may be neces-
sary to complete the search. 160 Justice Stevens contended that in a legiti-
mate search, the distinctions between a closed container found in a home
and one found in an automobile must give way to the completion of the
task at hand.' 6 1 Justice Stevens also indicated his agreement with that por-
155. 102 S. Ct. at 2169.
156. Id.
157. Id
158. Id at 2170. The Court reasoned that the practical considerations allowing the war-
rantless search of the automobile continue to exist for as long as it takes to complete the
search of the car and its contents. The majority conceded the feasibility of procuring a
warrant to open any closed containers found during a Carroll search. However, the majority
argued that such a rule would only exacerbate the intrusion on the right to privacy by forc-
ing the police to first comb the entire vehicle rather than immediately opening the single
container most likely to hold the object of the search. Id at 2171 n.28.
159. Id. at 2170 (citing Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153 (emphasis in Court opinion)).
160. Id. at 2170 (as cited in W. LAFAvE, supra note 11, § 4.10, at 152 (quoting Massey v.
Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1957))).
161. Justice Stevens wrote that:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have
been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers,
in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks
and wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the
prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand.
Id at 2170-71.
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tion of the Robbins rationale that rejected the worthy-unworthy container
distinction as being against the central purpose of the fourth amend-
ment.' 62 The Court stated that the new container rule must likewise apply
to all containers found during an automobile exception search. The ma-
jority acknowledged that the fourth amendment protects closed containers,
but noted that the protection varies with the circumstances. For example,
luggage can be inspected by customs officials, and the police can search a
container carried at the time of arrest despite the owner's desire to keep the
contents private. Similarly, the Court reasoned that the privacy expecta-
tion in a car and its contents must give way where probable cause exists. 63
Thus, the Court concluded that the scope of the automobile exception
search "is not defined by the nature of the container in which the contra-
band is secreted. Rather, it is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe it will be found.""
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, 65 arguing that
the majority opinion was not grounded in the automobile exception ration-
ale, that reliance on Carroll for the scope of the automobile exception was
misplaced, and that the opinion was contrary to the letter and spirit of the
automobile exception cases.
Justice Marshall argued that the majority erroneously relied on Carroll
for the premise that the scope of the automobile exception is as broad as
the search a magistrate could authorize by warrant. 66 He referred to the
162. Id. at 2171.
163. Id
164. Id at 2172. Finally, the Court noted that Ross is inconsistent with Robbins and
with that portion of Sanders on which the Robbins plurality relied, but stated that the doc-
trine of stare decisis did not preclude its present holding because the plurality rule in Rob-
bins had never enjoyed majority support. The Court noted that it was adhering to the
holding of Sanders, rejecting only its reasoning. The Court distinguished Chadwick and
Sanders by noting the limitations it had placed on Ross in order that Ross would not conflict
with these precedents. In Chadwick and Sanders the police did not have probable cause to
search the entire vehicle because the police already suspected that Chadwick's footlocker
and Sanders' green suitcase were the particular containers carrying drugs. In Ross, the
Court argued that the police did have probable cause to search the entire vehicle because
they did not have a suspicion as to the precise location of the drugs. Id at 2168. Therefore,
Chadwick and Sanders were distinguished as limiting the scope of a Ross search only when
the police suspect the precise location of the contraband. The Court stated that "U]ust as
probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not sup-
port a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented
aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase." Id
at 2172.
165. Justice White dissented separately on the ground that Robbins should not be over-
ruled. He indicated his agreement with much of Justice Marshall's dissent. Id at 2173
(White, J., dissenting).
166. ld at 2176-77. The dissent restated the familiar rationales of probable cause plus
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majority premise as a sleight of hand that "assumes what has never been
the law,"' 67 and one that ignores the obvious distinction between the func-
tion of the magistrate and the function of the automobile exception. The
dissenters noted that the magistrate's sole concern is to determine whether
the probable cause, as the police relate it, is sufficient to merit a warrant.
Exigent circumstances, such as the mobility of the container or the possi-
bility that evidence will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction, are
irrelevant to the magistrate's evaluation of probable cause. In contrast, a
police search under the automobile exception has two concerns; probable
cause and exigent circumstances. Only when the threshold criteria are met
may the police proceed without a warrant. Thus, the dissent argued that
the scope of the automobile exception actually is narrower than the scope
of the search that a magistrate could authorize.'68 The dissent concluded
that "the scope of a warrantless search should depend on the scope of the
justification for dispensing with a warrant,"' 69 and since containers do not
present exigent circumstances the majority's premise failed to support its
conclusion. 7°
The majority opinion was also criticized for the statement that Carroll
and Chambers supported the new container rule. The dissent argued that
the Court had previously allowed warrantless searches of integral com-
partments of cars, but not containers, because an integral compartment is
just as mobile as the car itself.'7 ' The exigent circumstances rationale,
therefore, justified a search of these compartments. The same cannot be
said of containers, however. Justice Marshall reasoned that "[t]he fact that
there may be a high expectation of privacy in both containers and com-
partments is irrelevant, since the privacy rationale is not, and cannot be,
the justification for the warrantless search of compartments."' 72 The dis-
exigency, and the lesser expectation of privacy in the automobile itself, and pointed out that
neither of these rationales apply to container cases. The mobility rationale was inapplicable
because containers "can easily be seized and brought before the magistrate." Id. at 2176
(Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent also supported the Chadwick-Sanders principle, argu-
ing that a container is not like a car because there is no diminished privacy interest. Id
Thus, the dissent claimed that the automobile exception was inapplicable and could not be
the basis for the majority opinion. Justice Marshall stated that "[uiltimately, the majority,
unable to rely on the justifications underlying the automobile exception, simply creates a
new 'probable cause' exception to the warrant requirement for automobiles." Id
167. Id
168. Seeid at 2176-77. The dissent noted that the majority premise would have changed
the result in Coolidge, where the Court held that probable cause alone was not sufficient to
search an automobile without having the magistrate issue a warrant.
169. Id at 2177 (emphasis in original).
170. Id.
171. Id at 2179.
172. Id
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sent concluded, therefore, that a rule which permits the warrantless search
of integral compartments while excluding containers is not "illogical" and
"absurd," as the majority suggested.' 73
The dissent also attacked the majority's argument that the new container
rule preserves the practical consequences of Carroll. Justice Marshall con-
ceded that there are practical problems in seizing and storing automobiles,
but argued that the practical problems of securing a container found dur-
ing a Carroll search and taking it to a magistrate simply do not rise to the
same level. He contended that the majority implicitly conceded this point
when it cited Chadwick with approval as reaffirming the general principle
that closed containers may not be opened without a warrant.' 74
Justice Marshall characterized the majority's effort to reconcile Ross
with Chadwick and Sanders' as one which would have "peculiar and
unworkable consequences."' 176 He argued that simply because the police
have been able to localize their suspicion to a particular container in a car,
that container is not more private and more subject to the warrant require-
ment than containers found when the police have only a more generalized
suspicion and must search the entire car to find the contraband.' 7 The
dissent therefore concluded that the only explanation for the new
container rule was expediency, and argued that it is well established that
"the mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never
by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. '
' 78
V. EXPEDIENCY TRUMPS EXIGENCY
Sanders, Robbins, and Ross all focused on the warrantless search of
closed containers found during a legitimate automobile exception search.
Sanders was limited to "personal luggage taken . .. from
automobiles,"'' 79 suggesting that the nature of the container determined
the scope of the automobile exception. Only high privacy containers were
173. Id
174. See id (citing opinion of the Court at 2169).
175. See supra note 164.
176. 102 S. Ct. at 2180 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
177. Id at 2179-80. Alternatively, the dissent pointed out that the majority's effort to
square Ross with Chadwick and Sanders may have suggested that where probable cause is
foreseeable, the police may not wait until the container is placed in the car and then take
advantage of the automobile exception. Id at 2180. The dissent argued that the exception
carved out in Ross for localized suspicion containers might well turn out to swallow the
majority's new container rule and charged that the majority's reasoning hardly clarified this
area of the law. Id.
178. Id at 2181 (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978)).
179. 442 U.S. at 765.
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put beyond its pale. The Court's purpose in granting certiorari in Robbins
was to alleviate the uncertainty created by Sanders.8° Once the Court
held, as it did in Robbins, that the warrant clause protected all closed con-
tainers, the next logical step was to exclude them from the reach of the
automobile exception. While Ross also rejected the worthy-unworthy
container argument, it held that the automobile exception reaches all con-
tainers found therein, and is, therefore, diametrically opposed to Sanders-
Robbins. The import of this is that under Sanders and Robbins, no
container found during an automobile exception search may be opened
without a warrant, while under Ross, all such containers may be opened
without a warrant. The difference is explained by the different analytical
frameworks.''
A. The Ross Framework
Ross stated that Carroll did not define the scope of the automobile ex-
ception,' 82 but suggested that its nature and scope is nonetheless contained
within the Carroll opinion. Ross construed the statement in Carroll which
requires that "[i]n cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably
practicable, it must be used,"' 8 3 to mean that Carroll had emphasized
probable cause.' 84 Thus, Ross concluded that the automobile exception
"applies only to searches of vehicles that are supported by probable
cause," 8 5 but nowhere mentioned exigent circumstances as an element of
the automobile exception. This omission raises the question of whether
Ross completely eliminates the exigent circumstances requirement,
thereby reducing the automobile exception from a two element rule to only
one. If Ross intended to include only probable cause and not exigent cir-
cumstances, then the dissent is correct in stating that Ross is an unprece-
dented probable cause exception to the warrant clause,8 6 and that a
180. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 423.
181. The Court viewed Sanders and Robbins as closed container cases and based its
analysis on the protection the fourth amendment affords such items. For Sanders-Robbins
analysis the place in which a closed container is found is immaterial. A warrant is required
to search a closed container despite the fact that it is found during an automobile exception
search. Thus, Sanders-Robbins used Chadwick as the framework for analyzing the protec-
tion afforded closed containers found in automobiles. On the other hand, Ross viewed the
closed container in the automobile as an automobile exception case governed by Carroll. In
Ross, any protection that the fourth amendment may extend to a container is immaterial
precisely because it is found during an automobile exception search.
182. See 102 S. Ct. at 2159.
183. Id. at 2163 (quoting Carroll, 267 U.S. at 156).
184. Id at 2163-64.
185. Id at 2164.
186. Id at 2176 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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warrant would never be required to search an automobile. The police
would have blanket authority to search on probable cause alone.
Ross does not explicitly reject exigent circumstances as part of the auto-
mobile exception. It simply fails to mention the role of exigency. How-
ever, it is possible to read Ross as impliedly conceding the necessity for a
two element rule. Ross makes a latent reference to a two element rule. In
a footnote, the majority cites with approval Justice Harlan's separate opin-
ion in Chambers for the proposition that exigency alone does not justify an
automobile exception search.'87 If exigency by itself is not sufficient to
trigger the automobile exception, then by definition there must be more
than one element. The other element is, of course, probable cause.'
88
Alternatively, Ross can be read to assume without discussion that prob-
able cause alone is sufficient to trigger the automobile exception. Prece-
dent and logic, however, demonstrate that such an assumption is
unfounded. In Chambers, the Court stated that "[n]either Carroll nor any
other cases in this Court require or suggest that in every conceivable cir-
cumstance the search of an auto even with probable cause may be made
without . . . a warrant .. . .But the circumstances that furnish probable
cause . . . are most often unforeseeable; [and] the opportunity to search is
fleeting ... ."'89 This passage from Chambers suggests that the Ross
Court misread Carroll when it cited that case's "warrant whenever practi-
cable" rule' 90 as manifestly emphasizing probable cause. Chambers makes
it clear that the automobile exception does not grant blanket authority to
search on probable cause alone. Similarly, Coolidge invalidated a war-
rantless search, holding that even though there had been probable cause,
there were no exigent circumstances.'91
Finally, the warrant clause itself establishes probable cause as the crite-
rion for obtaining a warrant. If probable cause is the standard for ob-
187. See id at 2163 n.9 (citing Chambers, 399 U.S. at 62-64 (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting)).
188. See also Moylan, supra note 12 and accompanying text (arguing that the automobile
exception is a two-element rule). A second obscure reference in Ross to a two-element rule
is found in the portion of the opinion that extends the probable cause rationale of the auto-
mobile exception to movable containers. The Court stated that "It]he rationale justifying a
warrantless search of an automobile that is believed to be transporting contraband arguably
applies with equal force to any movable container that is believed to be carrying an illicit
substance." 102 S. Ct. at 2165 (emphasis added). The Court's use of the word "transporting"
implicitly recognizes the exigent circumstances portion of the automobile exception. Had
Ross intended to eliminate the exigency portion of the rationale, there was language avail-
able to do so.
189. 399 U.S. at 50-51.
190. See supra text accompanying note 183.
191. 403 U.S. at 464.
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taining the warrant, it would be illogical to state that it is also the standard
for dispensing with the warrant. An exception to the warrant clause would
have to be based on something other than, or in addition to, probable
cause. In the case of the automobile exception, that additional element is,
obviously, the familiar phrase "exigent circumstances."' 9 2 The question,
then, is whether the automobile exception, when stated in full, justifies the
warrantless search of closed containers.
Ross claimed that its new container rule was supported by Chambers.
However, Ross failed to mention that the holding in Carroll was based
upon the mobility or exigent circumstances rationale.'93  Moreover, Car-
roll itself indicates that the automobile exception requires true exigent cir-
cumstances. Although it did not expressly use the term, the Court in
192. Carroll did not expressly use the term "exigent circumstances," and the Court did
not make clear whether the search there was sustained because the object searched was an
automobile or because it was a moving automobile presenting exigent circumstances. W.
LAFAVE, supra note 11, § 7.2(a)(1) at 510-11. However, it is clear that exigency was a factor
in Carroll because the Court noted that the mobility of an automobile makes it impractica-
ble to obtain a warrant. See Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153. See also supra text accompanying note
31. In addition, Carroll has been interpreted to mean that the mobility exigency is the ra-
tionale behind the automobile exception. See Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-51; W. RINGEL,
supra note 12, at § 10.2. The main problem with the mobility rationale is defining what
constitutes an exigent circumstance. Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Chambers are
unclear as to whether the mobility rationale is based on the inherent mobility of automobiles
as a generic class, in which case the automobile itself is an exigency, or whether there must
be a real possibility that the evidence will be lost. 1d, § 11.1(b) at 11-4. The Supreme Court
has not specifically addressed this question. The Court has attempted in Coolidge and Card-
well, however, to set the outer boundaries of the exigent circumstances-mobility rationale.
But, as previously noted, these two plurality opinions cannot be convincingly reconciled.
See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. The result is that lower courts disagree as to
what constitutes exigent circumstances. Some courts do require a particular showing of
truly exigent circumstances. See cases collected in W. RINGEL, supra note 12, § 11.1(b) at
11-5 nn.15-16.
It is clear that these courts require a showing of some form of exigency. The almost
universal requirement of exigent circumstances can be attributed to the fact that the
Supreme Court has consistently relied upon exigency in its automobile exception cases. See,
e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51; Cardwell, 583 U.S. at 594-95. Where
no exigency was found, the Supreme Court refused to uphold the warrantless search. Coo-
lidge, 403 U.S. at 464. Texas v. White, did not mention exigent circumstances, but merely
affirmed the warrantless search on the authority of Chambers. The recent case of Michigan
v. Thomas, 73 L. Ed.2d 750 (June 28, 1982), did uphold a warrantless search of an automo-
bile even though there were no exigent circumstances. But, Thomas is not an automobile
exception case. See supra note 64. In Thomas, the police were properly in possession of the
automobile for a routine inventory search prior to impoundment. Probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contained contraband did not arise until the search was well underway.
193. Carroll noted that mobility of the automobile is what makes it impracticable for the
police to obtain a warrant and is what distinguishes the warrantless search of an automobile
from the warrantless search of a dwelling or other structure. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 153; Cham-
bers, 399 U.S. at 52; Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973).
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Carroll observed that "[i]t is impossible to get a warrant to stop an auto-
mobile. Before a warrant could be secured the automobile would be be-
yond the reach of the officer ... ."194 Thus, Ross' claim that Carroll
permits a warrantless search based upon probable cause is inaccurate.
Carroll permits a warrantless search based upon probable cause where
true exigent circumstances are present. 195 Ross also asserts that it preserves
the practical consequences of Carroll. One of the practical problems of an
automobile search, in addition to the mobility problem, is deciding what to
do with the car and its occupants while a warrant is being obtained. This
problem is not totally insignificant, as Chambers recognized.' 96 Arguably,
the storage and safekeeping of containers found during a Carroll-Cham-
bers search is not a burden at all, or if it is, it simply does not rise to the
same level as the problems of storing and safeguarding vehicles.' 97 "The
practical mobility problem--deciding what to do with both the car and the
occupants if an immediate search is not conducted-is simply not present
in the case of movable containers, which can easily be seized and brought
to the magistrate."' 198 Thus, contrary to what Ross suggests, the practical
194. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 146 (quoting House Judiciary Committee Report to accompany
ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1921) supplementing the National Prohibition Act, ch. 85,
§ 25, 41 Stat. 305, 315 (1919)).
195. As used here, true exigent circumstances are intended to mean the very real possibil-
ity that the evidence will be lost or destroyed if the police must leave the scene and secure a
warrant. For a cogent argument that exigent circumstances is the only acceptable rationale
for the automobile exception, see Grano, supra note 1, at 638-46. According to Grano, exi-
gent circumstances can be defined in two ways: first, exigent circumstances exist only when
the police could not have obtained a warrant before probable cause arose; or second, exigent
circumstances exist only when the evidence cannot be preserved by making a warrantless
seizure. Id at 642. Under the second formulation, the warrantless search in Carroll would
have been unreasonable because the police could have seized the car to preserve the evi-
dence. Grano suggests that the second definition is preferable because the exigent circum-
stances rationale imports a need for immediate action. Hence, a warrantless seizure is
justified to prevent loss of the evidence. Once the property is safely in police custody the
need for immediate action disappears. Id at 643.
196. Had Chambers required the police to seize a car but obtain a warrant before the
search it would have established a constitutional requirement that all police departments, no
matter what their size or capabilities, maintain the staff and equipment to transport im-
pounded vehicles to a central location where they could be kept safely until a magistrate
ruled on the warrant. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 765 n.14. The Court observed in Sanders that
such a constitutional requirement would have imposed "severe, even impossible, burdens on
many police departments." Id But see Grano, supra note 1, at 643-44 (storing a vehicle does
not present any special difficulties). See also, Chambers, 399 U.S. at 64-65 (Harlan, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (the probable cause to search often justifies arrest, and when the
occupants are taken into custody they are not inconvenienced by the immobilization of the
vehicle).
197. See 102 S. Ct. at 2176 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. Id See also infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text, arguing that closed contain-
ers are not exigent items.
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consequences of seizing a car and seizing a container can be quite distinct.
If the proposition is accepted that the proper interpretation of the auto-
mobile exception as enunciated in Carroll is probable cause combined
with exigent circumstances, it becomes apparent that the automobile ex-
ception is not the proper framework for analyzing the right to privacy in
closed containers.
Chadwick conceded that cars and containers are alike in that both are
mobile.'99 However, the similarity is immaterial for purposes of fourth
amendment analysis. 2" The mobility rationale of the automobile excep-
tion is based on the very real probability that valuable evidence will be lost
if police must secure a warrant before searching or seizing a car.20 ' The
question of mobility does not arise in the case of containers found during
an automobile exception search because Chadwick requires that the exi-
gency as to a closed container be determined at the point in time immedi-
ately before the search.20 2 The police can easily seize a container without
creating serious problems for themselves because there is no danger that
the contents of the container will disappear.20 3 In short, containers do not
present exigent circumstances, and therefore the mobility portion of the
automobile exception cannot justify their searching them without a war-
rant.2" What Ross seems to suggest is that the exigencies which permit a
199. 433 U.S. at 12.
200. The Court stated that the mobility rationale could not justify the warrantless search
of the 200 pound footlocker because once it was in police control any danger that the evi-
dence would disappear ceased. Since the police had in fact immobilized the footlocker and
deprived the owner of possession, it was unreasonable to search it without a warrant. Id. at
13. The Court reasoned that the principal privacy interest at stake was not the container
itself but its contents, and concluded that the search of the footlocker was the greater intru-
sion on fourth amendment values, and its impoundment the lesser intrusion. Id at n.8. The
Chadwick majority noted that a line had to be drawn between reasonable and unreasonable
searches, and the fact that it was reasonably predictable that a magistrate would have issued
a warrant, had one been requested, could not save the search. It added that "[in our view,
when no exigency is shown to support the need for an immediate search, the Warrant Clause
places the line at the point where the property to be searched comes under the exclusive
dominion of police authority." Id. at 15. According to the Chadwick reasoning, a container
ceases to be an "exigent circumstance" at the moment the police seize it. At that moment
any mobility rationale for dispensing with a warrant also ceases. The Chadwick reasoning
can be applied to the automobile itself. See supra note 195 arguing that an automobile is not
inherently exigent.
201. See Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2175 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590;
Chambers, 399 U.S. at 50-51.
202. Sanders, 442 U.S. at 763.
203. Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2175-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
204. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. Arguably, the mobility rationale is inapplicable to a war-
rantless search of a closed container, irrespective of whether it is placed in an automobile or
elsewhere. Ross implicitly admits that the automobile exception framework is inappropriate
for analyzing closed container questions. Ross cites Chadwick as reaffirming "the general
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warrantless search of a car also support the warrantless search of any
container found therein. By this reasoning, the container itself becomes
exigent which, of course, cannot be true.2 °5.
Once it is recognized that cars and containers are separate questions for
purposes of fourth amendment analysis, the remainder of Ross loses much
of its force, 206 and its attempt to carve out an exception for Chadwick and
Sanders type containers is unconvincing. The majority distinguished
Chadwick and Sanders because in both cases suspicion as to the location
principle that closed packages and containers may not be searched without a warrant," 102
S. Ct. at 2166, and states further that the seizure of a container can be accomplished without
great inconvenience to either the individual or the police. Id. at n. 16. In light of Ross'
recognition of the Chadwick principles, the insistence in Ross that the automobile exception
justifies the warrantless search of containers is inconsistent. Chadwick rejected that very no-
tion. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13.
205. An argument that the container itself is exigent can be made by way of analogy to
decisions that hold that the automobile is a generically exigent item. See supra notes 44 &
192. However, the Supreme Court refused to equate cars and containers in Chadwick, on
the ground that they were different both in function and in expectation of privacy. While the
main function of an automobile is transportation, the main function of the closed container
is to carry personal property. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
206. The Court's analogy to the lawful search of fixed premises has surface appeal. Ross
is correct when it notes that a warrant to search a home "is not limited by the possibility that
separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search." 102 S. Ct. at
2170. A warrant to search fixed premises unquestionably includes authority to search closed
containers. W. LAFAvE, supra note 11, § 4.10 at 152 (quoting Massey v. Commonwealth,
305 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1957)). The analogy is, however, inapplicable for the simple rea-
son that automobile exception searches are conducted without a warrant.
The lesser expectation of privacy rationale that is sometimes used to justify warrantless
searches of automobiles is also inapplicable to closed containers. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at
13. The lesser privacy expectation, as noted previously, is not properly a part of the automo-
bile exception. Rather, it has been used to justify warrantless searches of automobiles that
the Court deemed reasonable despite the fact that exigent circumstances or probable cause
were virtually nonexistent. See supra note 64. Since the lesser expectation of privacy in the
car is not part of the automobile exception, it certainly cannot be piped into that exception
for the sole purpose of justifying the warrantless search of higher privacy items such as
containers. As the Court noted in Sanders, "[olne is not less inclined to place ... personal
possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase is to be carried in an automobile rather
than transported by other means or temporarily checked or stored." Sanders, 442 U.S. at
764. The maxim that "[tihe word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the
Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears," Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 461-62, becomes all
the more true when applied to higher privacy items that happen to be placed in an automo-
bile. Thus, the right to privacy is not diminished, as Ross suggests, simply because the
container is placed in an automobile. See also Grano, supra note 1, at 637-38 (lesser expec-
tation of privacy rationale does not support an automobile exception search of a car or of
closed containers). The Court's analogies to searches by customs officials and searches of
luggage with a warrant to illustrate the various degrees of fourth amendment protection of
containers are again irrelevant. The latter example, like the analogy to fixed premises, is a
search warrant illustration; the customs search, while lawful, is not conducted as an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.
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of the drugs was confined solely to the footlocker in the former and the
green suitcase in the latter. Because the police knew the precise location of
the evidence, they did not have probable cause to search the entire vehi-
cle.2 7 Accordingly, Chadwick and Sanders could not properly be viewed
as automobile exception cases. 208 This reasoning suggests that the auto-
mobile exception applies only when the police do not know the exact loca-
tion of the evidence and must search the entire vehicle to find it. If the
majority reasoning is accepted, it appears that the result in Ross would
have been different had the police informant explicitly said that "Bandit"
was storing heroin in a brown paper bag in the trunk rather than ambigu-
ously stating that the drugs were in the car. In this situation the police
would have known the precise location of the contraband, thus placing the
facts squarely within the Chadwick-Sanders exception to Ross. Ultimately,
the majority, while claiming to preserve the practical consequences of Car-
roll, creates its own set of practical problems and places police officers with
probable cause in a peculiar situation: when the precise location of the
evidence is known, the warrant clause applies; when there is only a genera-
lized suspicion, the automobile exception applies. In the former, the police
must seize the container and secure a warrant to search it; in the latter,
they need not do so. Faced with a container rule that turns on the degree
of suspicion, the government, as Justice Marshall stated, "must show that
the investigating officer knew enough but not too much, that he had suffi-
cient knowledge to establish probable cause but insufficient knowledge to
know exactly where the contraband was located."20 9 Ross does not ex-
plain why precise location containers are more deserving of constitutional
protection than generalized suspicion containers. The distinction reinstates
207. 102 S. Ct. at 2166-67.
208. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 767 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
209. 102 S. Ct. at 2180 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d
1159, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)). The "worthy-unworthy"
container distinction creates its own internal inconsistency. The preference for having a
neutral and detached magistrate pass on the sufficiency of probable cause prior to infringing
fourth amendment interests, see supra note 47, would seemingly require the exception
carved out in Ross for Chadwick-Sanders type "precise-location" containers to be the oppo-
site of what the Court states. The more the police know about the contents of a container
and its location, the less the need for the magistrate's judgment. Conversely, the less that is
known about the container and its whereabouts in the car, the greater the need for the im-
partial and neutral magistrate to weigh the facts. Ultimately, the effort to square Ross with
Chadwick and Sanders proves too much. Ross cannot be squared with Chadwick precisely
because Chadwick holds the rationale of the automobile exception inapplicable to the war-
rantless search of a closed footlocker. Thus, Chadwick refused to mix cars and containers
for purposes of fourth amendment analysis. Arguably, the Chadwick principle would hold
regardless of whether the footlocker was a precise location or generalized suspicion
container.
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a worthy-unworthy container concept that turns on the quality of the po-
liceman's knowledge rather than on the character of the container itself,
and thus directly contradicts Ross' own rejection of such a notion.210
The logic of Ross is seriously flawed. It misstates the automobile excep-
tion as originally envisioned in Carroll. Consequently, the major premise
of Ross fails to support the conclusion that the automobile exception per-
mits the warrantless search of closed containers. In Ross, the Court fell
into the pitfalls it had carefully avoided in Belton and Robbins. Those two
cases took care to keep the automobile exception and the search incident to
arrest exception conceptually distinct.211 Unfortunately, Ross indiscrimi-
nately mixes cars and containers. However, Ross does provide the police
with a clear, easily applicable automobile exception rule. By emphasizing
expediency over exigency, Ross joins the trend of other recent fourth
amendment cases that standardize the rules governing the law of search
and seizure.21 2
B. The Trend Toward Standardization
The fourth amendment has two clauses; the first prohibits all unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, the second states the criteria for obtaining a
search warrant. The key word "unreasonable" is not defined, and the
amendment does not give any indication of how the two clauses relate to
each other. The confusion and complexity of search and seizure law stems,
in part, from a judicial difference of opinion as to whether the word unrea-
sonable applies only to the first clause or to both.2t 3 The automobile ex-
ception cases illustrate this point. When the issue is the authority of police
to conduct a warrantless search of containers found during a legitimate
automobile exception search, a Robbins-type rule results when the reason-
ableness of securing a warrant is emphasized. Under Robbins, the search
of a closed container, no matter how reasonable, will be unconstitutional
210. 102 S. Ct. at 2171.
211. See supra notes 124-35 and accompanying text. Justice Powell's concurring opinion
in Robbins noted that the search incident to arrest and automobile exceptions proceed on
wholly different theories and that "[i]ntelligent analysis cannot proceed unless the issues are
addressed separately." Robbins, 453 U.S. at 430 (Powell, J., concurring). See also supra
note 209 (arguing that Chadwick correctly refused to mix cars and containers).
212. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of automobile incident to
arrest includes the entire passenger compartment); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420
(1981) (automobile exception does not include warrantless search of closed containers);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full scale search of person may be made in
connection with a valid arrest); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (automobile prop-
erly in possession of police may be searched without a warrant).
213. See E. GRISWOLD, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A DILEMMA OF THE SUPREME COURT
41-42 (1975).
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because the police could easily seize the container and take it to the magis-
trate for a determination of probable cause. Conversely, the opposite re-
sult obtains when the reasonableness of the search is emphasized. Here,
the hypothetical situation posed in Ross becomes very convincing: if it
was reasonable to tear open the upholstery in Carroll, it would have been
just as reasonable to open a burlap bag hidden inside. Hence, Ross is able
to state with some accuracy that the contrary rule would be illogical and
absurd. The constant shifting in emphasis produces irreconcilable and
contradictory decisions.214 Coolidge and Cardwell wound up in the same
plight when the issue was how to set the outer boundaries of the exigent
circumstances of the Carroll-Chambers doctrine. 2I" Both schools of
thought have their practical problems. 216 Regardless of the ideological de-
bate over whether the word unreasonable applies only to the first clause or
both, the only concept that emerges with clarity is that each time the Court
shifts its emphasis the lower courts will not know how to apply the princi-
ples to a recurring factual situation, nor will the police know the scope of
their authority.2' Another contributing factor to the search and seizure
morass is that the circumstances of a warrantless search can vary almost
infinitely, and a small difference in the facts of a case may often be the
controlling factor in determining fourth amendment rights.2'8
The continuous confusion as to the outer limits of the exceptions to the
warrant clause has sparked a Supreme Court trend to decide its search and
seizure cases on a fairly broad basis.219 The thrust of the trend is to stand-
ardize these decisions by developing a category of cases with a clear-cut
rule that will apply to the category regardless of variations in the factual
pattern.220 The standardization approach is premised on the argument
that one of the purposes of the fourth amendment, and the exclusionary
214. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 74 & 192 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 23-24
(1969) (arguing that emphasizing the warrant requirement over the reasonableness of the
search "has stood the Fourth Amendment on its head."); E. GRISWOLD, supra note 213, at
39-41 (analogizing the inherent difficulties in determining the reasonableness of the search to
what would occur if the "reasonable man" standard of tort law were elevated to a constitu-
tional principle.) "The result is an inherent amount of uncertainty, and this uncertainty
extends to the lower courts, which have to try to apply the decisions of the Supreme Court."
Id. at 40. Dean Griswold suggests that in another context the fourth amendment could be
considered "void for vagueness." Id at 39.
217. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60.
218. See Sanders, 442 U.S. at 757; E. GRISWOLD, supra note 213, at 40.
219. See supra note 212.
220. See E. GRISWOLD, supra note 213, at 47.
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rule, is to regulate the police in their everyday activities. 2 Accordingly,
search and seizure law must necessarily be expressed in terms that are
readily understood and easily applied by police officers on their beat. 222 As
one commentator has noted:
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs,
ands, and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and
hairline distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which
the facile minds of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may
be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in the
field.'
223
Standardization allows the Court to remove itself from the problems it
creates each time it shifts the placement of the word unreasonable in the
fourth amendment. Robbins, Ross, and Belton illustrate the practical dif-
ferences between the standardization approach and the ideological debate
approach. Robbins and Ross each state unambiguous rules. However,
each case is tangled up in the continual and unresolvable debate about
where to place the word unreasonable. Consequently, each case, despite its
superficial clarity, leaves more uncertainty in its wake. Robbins gave rise
to the localized suspicion container issue which was unconvincingly ad-
dressed in Ross.224 Ross leaves open the issue of whether the automobile
exception can logically rest on probable cause alone.225 This issue will no
doubt be raised in the lower courts. Hence, the ideological debate forces
the Court into a case-by-case review of fourth amendment issues. In con-
trast, Be/ton removed itself from the ideological struggle by basing its
holding on a generalized standard: search of an automobile incident to
arrest includes all articles within the passenger compartment.226
221. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The
Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141.
222. Id Professor LaFave notes that the fourth amendment's guarantee of freedom from
unreasonable searches and seizures is best viewed as a "regulatory canon" that limits arbi-
trary governmental intrusion rather than as "a collection of atomistic spheres of interest of
individual citizens." Id at 142 (quoting Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amend-
ment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 375 (1974)). Accordingly, the commands of the fourth amend-
ment are best met by developing a set of rules which make it possible for the police to
determine in advance whether a warrantless search is justified, and thereby reduce the risk
of error. Id "In short, we must resist 'the understandable temptation to be responsive to
every relevant shading of every relevant variation of every relevant complexity' lest we wind
up with 'a fourth amendment with all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach
blot.'" Id (quoting Amsterdam, at 375). See also E. GRISWOLD, supra note 213, at 52.
223. LaFave, supra note 221, at 141 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082,
1122 (Wilkey, J., dissenting)).
224. See Ross, 102 S. Ct. at 2167-68.
225. Id at 2174 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
226. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
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Robbins and Ross are both attempts at standardization that fell short.
Both cases state clear rules which the police can easily understand and
apply. Robbins prohibits the warrantless search of all closed containers
found during an automobile exception search. Conversely, Ross permits a
warrantless search of the same containers. These clear-cut, all inclusive
rules indicate that the Court was using standardization to clarify the com-
plexities and confusion surrounding the automobile exception. Unfortu-
nately, the Court in Ross may have frustrated its own efforts. Robbins
provided the police and courts with specific guidance to be used in recur-
ring factual situations, as standardization requires. Less than a year later,
Ross gave totally contradictory guidance and needlessly created a new rule
to replace the Robbins standard. Such back-to-back decisions create their
own confusion, make the Court appear inconsistent, and do little to bring
certainty and stability to this area of the law.
Attractive as standardization may be, it is not a sufficient justification for
the rule in Ross. A constitutional standard cannot rest on clarity alone; it
must be supported by logic and a valid interpretation of precedent. Ross
lacks these virtues. Robbins, whatever its shortcomings, came closer to a
solid standard founded upon logic and consistency. Robbins recognized
that the precedents established in Chadwick and Sanders precluded using
the automobile exception to justify the warrantless search of closed con-
tainers. Justice Powell argued for standardization in Robbins, stating that
"expanding the scope of the automobile exception is attractive not so much
for its logical virtue, but because it . . would give more specific guidance
to police and courts in this recurring situation. 227 Ross attempted stand-
ardization but its logic is unsound. Perhaps a later Court will accomplish
both.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ross uses the automobile exception to permit a warrantless search of
closed containers found during a legitimate automobile exception search.
However, the rationale behind the automobile exception is not appropriate
for determining the right of privacy in closed containers. Because the
Court indiscriminately mixed cars and containers for purposes of fourth
amendment analysis, the analytical foundation is inappropriate to the case,
and the major premise of Ross, therefore, fails to support its conclusion.
In addition, Ross' attempt to distinguish earlier closed container cases is
unconvincing. The distinction between "precise location" and "genera-
lized suspicion" containers reinstates a worthy-unworthy container con-
227. Robbins, 453 U.S. at 435 (Powell J., concurring).
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cept that turns on the quality of the policeman's knowledge about the
location of the container and its contents. The distinction directly con-
tradicts Ross' explicit rejection of such a notion and creates the very confu-
sion for the police that Ross sought to avoid. Finally, Ross invites further
litigation by leaving unanswered the question of whether the automobile
exception can logically rest on probable cause alone.
Ross, however, is not without virtue. It was intended to state a clear,
easily applicable automobile exception rule, and to this extent it succeeded
despite all its logical flaws. In this regard Ross is an attempt to join a
growing series of decisions that standardize the law as concerns the excep-
tions to the warrant clause. Standardization creates a category or class of
cases and then develops a clear rule that applies regardless of variations in
the facts. The standardization approach gives lower courts clear guidance,
allows the police to know the limits of their authority, and permits individ-
uals some certainty as to the extent of their right of privacy. If nothing
else, Ross does set a clear-cut, easily applicable rule; its failing is that it
misused logic and precedent to achieve its goal.
Catherine A. Shepard
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